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In this dissertation, I focus on macroeconomic and macroprudential policies. In
Chapter 1, I study the effectiveness of macroprudential policy tools on bank risk. The
findings show that although macroprudential policy tools can stabilize the financial
system, under certain conditions, they might have perverse effects. In Chapter 2, I
examine monetary aggregates, and show that once measured correctly, they can be
useful in gauging the stance of monetary policy. In Chapter 3, by studying the deter-
minants of sovereign debt crises, I aim at improving our understanding of sovereign
debt distress, and also strengthening the toolkit for crisis prevention.
Chapter 1: Following the 2007-2009 financial crisis, there has been an increase
in the use of macroprudential policy tools – such as loan-to-value ratio caps and
interbank exposure limits – to achieve financial stability. Existing research on the
effectiveness of macroprudential policy has focused on country-level variables such as
total credit growth and house price inflation. In “The Effectiveness of Macropruden-
tial Policy on Bank Risk,” I study how the effectiveness of macroprudential policy
varies across banks and policy tools. Using system GMM on bank-level data from
30 European countries for the time period between 2000 and 2014, I document that
stricter regulation in the form of exposure limitations tends to decrease banks’ risk
levels whereas capital-based tools tend to induce higher risk-taking. After a policy
tightening, loan loss provisions and non-performing loans ratios of banks suffering
losses can increase substantially, up to five percentage points, while they are likely to
decrease for profitable banks. Constraining activities by stricter regulation can lead
to a search for yield. Therefore, policy designers should pay particular attention to
the increase in risk-taking following policy tightening, especially by banks suffering
losses.
Chapter 2: It is crucial for policymakers to successfully gauge the stance of mon-
etary policy and understand the mechanisms through which it affects the economy.
Conventional models focus on interest rates alone, and omit monetary aggregates
from policy discussions. In “Do Monetary Aggregates Belong in a Monetary Model?
Evidence from the UK,” I examine whether augmenting the measure of monetary
policy with monetary aggregates helps in drawing more robust links between policy
and economic fluctuations. After constructing the Divisia money index for the United
Kingdom, I employ structural vector autoregression to identify two different episodes
of UK monetary policy regimes. Inclusion of this (correct) measure of the quantity
of money and disentangling money supply from money demand remedy the price
and liquidity puzzles which frequently appear in the vector autoregression literature.
The results point to the informational content embedded in monetary aggregates,
and suggest that monetary aggregates should be taken into account while evaluating
monetary policy.
Chapter 3: In assessing debt sustainability for advanced and emerging markets,
the IMF’s Market Access Countries’ Debt Sustainability Analysis (MAC DSA) com-
pares the levels of debt and gross financing needs (GFNs) against benchmarks sepa-
rately derived from the noise-to-signal approach. In “Determinants of Sovereign Debt
Crises,” I identify the main factors that contribute to sovereign debt crises. I take
into account a broad range of debt distress drivers, including debt levels and gross fi-
nancing needs, but also debt composition, macroeconomic fundamentals, and country
characteristics such as whether the country is a small state or member of a currency
union. By using the estimation results, I first derive an indicative cutoff probability of
debt distress level. Then, I calculate the corresponding thresholds for debt variables,
above which countries are predicted to experience an episode of debt distress.
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CHAPTER 1
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY ON
BANK RISK
1 Introduction
This chapter studies the effectiveness of macroprudential policy on bank risk, mea-
sured by the loan loss reserves ratio and the non-performing loans ratio. I show that
the effectiveness of macroprudential policy tools depends on bank characteristics such
as specialization and profitability. Stricter regulation in the form of exposure limita-
tions tend to decrease banks’ risk levels whereas capital-based tools tend to induce
higher risk-taking. Moreover, upon facing stricter regulation, banks already suffering
losses are more likely to increase their risk levels.
Governments regulate financial institutions to ensure that they are safe and able
to honor their obligations. Traditional regulation has consisted of firm-level oversight,
which is concerned with the stability of individual financial institutions. Since the
financial crisis between 2007 and 2009, traditional regulation has come under scrutiny
as it contributed to the global financial crisis by allowing financial vulnerabilities to
grow. The bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers, a systemically im-
portant financial institution (SIFI), led market disturbances to spread to the rest
of the financial system, and brought limiting “contagion” to the forefront of finan-
cial regulation.1 As a result, authorities in many countries have started to explore
a more systemic approach to financial regulation. This holistic approach is called
macroprudential policy. However, as Blanchard et al. (2014) note, “Macroprudential
tools are new, and little is known about how effective they can be. They are exposed
1See Acharya and Öncü (2013) for the channels through which the failure of SIFIs could pose a
systemic risk to the financial system.
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to circumvention and subject to thorny political economy constraints.” As the use of
macroprudential policy tools gains popularity, evaluating the effectiveness of different
tools becomes crucial for policy making purposes.
Existing studies in the literature focus on the effects of macroprudential policy on
aggregate macroeconomic variables such as total credit in the economy, asset prices
(particularly housing prices), and leverage ratios. For example, in a recent study,
Akinci and Ohmstead-Rumsey (2017) show that macroprudential policy tightenings
are associated with lower bank credit growth, housing credit growth, and house price
inflation. Similarly, Cerutti et al. (2015) find that stricter macroprudential regula-
tion is associated with lower credit growth, especially in household credit. However,
using aggregate variables might mask important facts, especially when the policy can
affect different institutions in opposite directions. If following macroprudential policy
tightening, risk levels are increasing for certain institutions and decreasing for others,
the overall risk levels might be unaffected. This might result in drawing the wrong
conclusion that macroprudential policy does not affect the financial institutions’ risk
levels. Employing micro-level data allows us to account for the heterogeneity across
financial institutions.
I employ bank-level data from 30 European countries for the time period between
2000 and 2014 and combine these with the macroprudential policy data gathered
by the International Banking Research Network (IBRN).2 IBRN data account for
various instruments utilized by policy makers: capital requirements, loan-to-value
ratio limits, interbank exposure limits, concentration limits, reserve requirements
on foreign currency-denominated accounts, reserve requirements on local currency-
denominated accounts, and sector-specific capital buffers.
My findings suggest that interbank exposure limits, concentration limits, and cap-
ital based instruments affect overall risk levels of all three type of banks: commercial,
savings, and cooperative banks. I document that stricter regulation in the form of
exposure limitations tends to decrease banks’ risk levels whereas capital-based tools
2See Cerutti et al. (2016) for the detailed description of the IBRN Prudential Instruments
Database.
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tend to induce higher risk-taking. Furthermore, after a macroprudential policy tight-
ening, loan loss provisions and non-performing loans ratios of banks suffering losses
can increase substantially, up to five percentage points, while they are likely to de-
crease for profitable banks. These differential effects depending on profitability levels
are particularly visible when loan-to-value ratio limits are employed on commercial
banks, concentration limits are employed on savings banks, and interbank exposure
and concentration limits are employed on cooperative banks.
These findings point to the perverse effects macroprudential policy tightenings
could have on bank risk. Constraining business activities by stricter regulation can
lead to a search for yield and higher risk-taking, especially by banks suffering losses.
Differential effects depending on profitability highlight the importance of evaluating
the effectiveness of macroprudential policy tools at the micro (bank) level as opposed
to the aggregate (market) level. Using aggregate level data might result in opposing
effects to cancel each other, and thus, conceal the true nature of the relationship
between macroprudential policy tools and financial institutions. Policy designers
should take into account that certain tools such as exposure limitations are more
effective in decreasing risk levels. Furthermore, they should reconsider subjecting
all banks to the same regulations, independent of their profitability levels, as banks
suffering losses are more inclined to “double down” and increase their risk-taking.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the
literature on bank risk and macroprudential policy. Section 3 explains commonly used
macroprudential policy tools in detail. Section 4 provides information on different
types of banks studied in this chapter, namely commercial, savings, and cooperative
banks. Section 5 explains the data by providing variable definitions, data sources, and
summary statistics. Section 6 summarizes the results, and the last section provides
concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review
The relationship between bank risk and policy has been studied in the context of
monetary policy. Recent work on the effect of monetary policy on bank risk-taking
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documents higher risk levels at times of lower interest rates, but also stresses the
importance of bank characteristics such as capital ratio. Altunbas et al. (2010) study
the relationship between short-term interest rates and bank risk by using a unique
database that includes quarterly balance sheet information for listed banks operating
in the European Union and the United States from 1998 to 2008. Their findings
suggest that unusually low interest rates over an extended period of time contributed
to an increase in banks’ risk levels. Maddaloni and Peydro (2011) use a unique data
set of the Euro area and U.S. bank lending standards, and find that low short-term
interest rates weaken standards for household and corporate loans. Securitization
activity, weak supervision for bank capital, and longer duration for low interest rates
exacerbate this softening, especially for mortgages. De Nicolo et al. (2010) argue
that financial intermediaries’ degree of limited liability and financial health play an
important role in their risk taking. When the policy rate is low, well-capitalized
banks increase risk-taking and poorly capitalized banks do the opposite. Delis and
Kouretas (2010) uses data from Euro area banks over the period 2001-2008 and present
evidence that low interest rates substantially increase bank risk-taking. This negative
relationship is shown to be weaker for banks with high levels of capitalization and
stronger for banks that engage in non-traditional banking activities with a higher
volume of off-balance sheet items.
Use of macroprudential policy gained popularity since the global financial crisis of
2007. Researchers assembled comprehensive databases and studied the effectiveness
of these policies, particularly for credit levels and house prices. Akinci and Ohmstead-
Rumsey (2017) construct a novel index of domestic macroprudential policies in 57 ad-
vanced and emerging economies covering the period from 2000:Q1 to 2013:Q4, with
macroprudential tightenings and easings recorded separately. Their findings show
that macroprudential policies have been used far more actively after the global finan-
cial crisis in both advanced and emerging market economies, and usually in tandem
with changes in bank reserve requirements, capital flow management measures, and
monetary policy. The housing sector was the prime target of macroprudential policy
changes, especially in the advanced economies. Their empirical analysis suggests that
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macroprudential tightenings are associated with lower bank credit growth, housing
credit growth, and house price inflation. Targeted policies such as those specifically
intended to limit the growth of housing credit are shown to be more effective. Cerutti
et al. (2015) examine the use of macroprudential policies for 119 countries over the
2000-2013 period. They find that emerging economies use macroprudential policies
most frequently, particularly foreign exchange related ones, and advanced countries
use borrower-based policies more often. Macroprudential tightenings are generally
associated with lower growth in credit, especially in household credit.
In particular, capital- and borrower-based tools drew attention of researchers
studying the effectiveness of macroprudential policy. Buchholz (2015) investigates
the effect of caps on banks’ leverage (a capital-based macroprudential tool) on do-
mestic credit to the private sector since the global financial crisis. He shows that
real credit grew after the crisis at considerably higher rates in countries which had
implemented the leverage cap prior to the crisis, which suggests that banks were able
to draw on buffers built up prior to the crisis. Igan and Kang (2011) study the Korean
experience with macroprudential measures and find that loan-to-value and debt-to-
income limits (two borrower-based tools) are associated with a decline in house price
appreciation and transaction activity.
Macroprudential policy is subject to leakages and avoidance, and this could render
it ineffective at country level. Cerutti et al. (2015) find that macroprudential policy
is less effective in financially more developed and open economies. It is associated
with greater cross-border borrowing, suggesting avoidance. Reinhardt and Sowerbutts
(2015) study whether macroprudential regulations affect international banking flows.
Their findings suggest that borrowing by the domestic non-bank sector from foreign
banks increases after domestic authorities take a macroprudential capital action, but
no increase in borrowing from foreign banks is observed after a macroprudential ac-
tion which tightens lending standards, such as limits on loan-to-value ratios for house
purchase. Cizel et al. (2016) find evidence of substitution effects towards nonbank
credit when macroprudential policy restricts bank credit. The substitution effect is
especially strong in advanced economies, and reduces the effectiveness of macropru-
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dential policy. Their findings highlight the need to extend macroprudential policy
beyond banking, especially in advanced economies. Finally, by employing the IBRN
Prudential Instruments Database, Berrospide et al. (2017) show that stricter foreign
prudential regulation shifts lending away from the countries of origin and increases
total lending into the U.S. However, the identified spillovers are of small magnitudes.
Macroprudential policy could also cause risk-shifting. Jiménez et al. (2017) study
the impact of dynamic provisioning, which implies pro-cyclical bank capital regula-
tion, on credit supply cycles and the associated spillovers on real activity by employing
Spanish credit register data. They find that the level at which banks are affected by
the policy change has important compositional effects in credit supply and risk. Pro-
cyclical bank capital regulation is shown to result in a credit supply contraction in
good times. However, firms are shown to substitute credit from less affected banks,
and therefore no impact on firm total assets, employment, or survival is found. The
banks with higher capital requirements focus their credit supply to firms with a higher
ex-ante interest paid and leverage, and with a higher ex-post default, suggesting that
higher capital requirements may increase bank risk-taking and searching-for-yield.
The negative impact of higher requirements on credit is stronger for smaller firms
and banks, which have difficulty in absorbing the shock.
3 Macroprudential Policy Tools
The IBRN Prudential Instruments Database contains data for various prudential
instruments. These instruments are classified under five broad categories:
General capital requirements
Financial institutions are required to maintain a certain amount of capital to en-
able them to absorb losses on loans or securities. The amount of required capital is
given by the capital adequacy ratio. The general capital requirements index records
the implementation of Basel Accords, which govern capital requirements for banks.
The Basel Committee, established by the central bank governors of the Group of Ten
countries at the end of 1974 and headquartered at the Bank for International Set-
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tlements in Basel, was established to enhance financial stability, to improve banking
supervision quality, and to serve as a forum for regular international cooperation on
banking supervision. The Committee has established a series of international stan-
dards for bank regulation. Its most notable publications are the accords on capital
adequacy known as Basel I, Basel II, Basel II.5, and Basel III. The general cap-
ital requirements index records adoption of each accord as a tightening of capital
requirements, with the exception of Basel II, which was considered as neutral over
minimum capital requirements. It is important to emphasize the index records the
policy changes when the laws are implemented in each country, not when they are
passed.
A brief timeline of the Basel Accords is as follows. Basel I, adopted in 1988,
called for a minimum ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets of 8% for banks to be
implemented by the end of 1992. By introducing a standardized definition of capital
adequacy, it raised awareness for prudent capital management across the financial
industry. The Accord evolved over time and started to address not only credit risk,
but also market risk. The 1997 amendment allowed banks to use internal models
(value-at-risk models) for the first time as a basis for measuring their market risk
capital requirements. In 2004, a revised framework for capital management, known
as Basel II, was adopted. Basel II broadened the focus of risk assessment and man-
agement by improving the way regulatory capital requirements reflected underlying
risks and by addressing the financial innovation that had occurred in recent years.
Additional supervisory oversight on calculating capital requirements, required assess-
ment of both credit and operational risks, and enhanced levels of disclosures regarding
banks’ risk profiles, capital structures, risk management and capital adequacy were
required. However, the aggregate level of minimum capital requirements were broadly
maintained (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006). Basel II was further
fortified in 2009 by the adoption of Basel II.5, which introduced tougher regulations
that required banks to hold larger amounts of capital against the market risks they
incurred in their trading operations. Basel II and Basel II.5 were criticized for not do-
ing enough to prevent the financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing financial meltdown.
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In particular, the view that internal models employed by banks to measure their risk
exposure were more successful than external models employed by external supervisory
agencies was challenged. In 2010, Basel III, which endorses new capital and liquidity
standards, was adopted. It required banks to maintain healthier amounts of “true”
capital by regulating Tier 1 capital ratios which exclude preferred equity and other
hybrid capital instruments.3
Figure 1.1: Use of Macroprudential Policy Tools for Selected Countries: 2000-2014
Note: The vertical axis measures the tightenings and loosenings in the macroprudential
policy tool indexes.
Sector-specific capital buffers (SSCB)
The sector-specific capital buffers index records capital based regulatory changes
3For more details on Basel accords, see http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm and http:
//www.advisoryhq.com/articles/basel-i-2-2-5-3/
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aimed at curtailing credit growth in specific sectors. This type of prudential changes
require adding to bank capital when there are signs of unusually strong credit growth
or when there are signs of a credit-driven asset price boom. They are usually im-
plemented by changing the risk-weights of real estate and consumer credits while
calculating capital adequacy. The tying of changes in capital buffers to the financial
cycle is often referred as dynamic capital buffers. Examples of this type of regulation
are the increase of risk weights on foreign-exchange denominated retail credit expo-
sures to 100% in Poland in 2012 and the increase in the risk weight floor on mortgages
from 15% to 25% in Sweden in 2014.
Reserve requirements (RR)
Reserve requirements are usually used for conducting monetary policy. How-
ever, developing countries employ them as countercyclical macroprudential tools as
well. Based primarily on IMF’s Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments Survey,
changes in reserves requirements aiming at prudential objectives are recorded under
two subcategories: reserve requirements on local-currency denominated accounts, and
reserve requirements on foreign-currency denominated accounts. Reserve requirement
ratios are usually reported as a number, however the requirements may depend on
the type of accounts and on the maturity of deposits. The indexes defined for reserve
requirements capture the overall levels within the broad categories of local-currency
denominated accounts and foreign-currency denominated accounts. As an example,
the central bank of Bulgaria expanded the coverage of reserve requirements to in-
clude all liabilities previously excluded from the deposit base, except subordinated
debt, debt-capital hybrid instruments, and repo agreements among banks. The re-
serve requirement ratio for the newly included liabilities was set at 4%, a ratio lower
than the regular ratio of 8%.
Concentration limits and interbank exposure limits
Limits on concentrated exposures and on exposures to other banks are policies
which affect claims between banks and their borrowers. These limits are changed by
modifying the elements that characterize the exposures. For example, the definition
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of “large exposure” can be revised. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2014) classifies an exposure as large when “the sum of all exposure values of a bank
to a counterparty or to a group of connected counterparties... is equal to or above 10%
of the bank’s eligible capital base.” However, this definition changes from country to
country. Aggregate concentration limits, which restrict the sum of all large exposures
as a share of eligible capital, are another way of changing the limits. Another method
of limitation would be differentiating counterparties by using the perceived riskiness
and the duration of the claims for determining the weights on exposures. Lastly,
sectors and assets that are covered by the regulation could be changed. The regulation
may cover the exposures of depository institutions only or it may include those of
non-bank financial institutions as well. On the counterparty side, certain sectors or
certain assets such as interbank lending could be excluded from the concentration
limits. An example of changing concentration limits is the abolition of the sum of
large exposure limits in Norway in 2010, which was equal to 800 percent of bank’s
capital. An example of changing interbank exposure limits is the U.K.’s exemption
policy for interbank exposures. Before 31 December 2010, interbank exposures shorter
in outstanding maturity of one year were exempted in the U.K. From 31 December
2010 onwards, the exemption was reduced to intraday exposures.
Loan to value (LTV) ratio limits
The loan to value ratio ratio determines the amount that can be borrowed against
the value of collateral. The LTV index records the tightenings and loosenings on LTV
ratio limits, regardless of the type of the lender. These limits are most commonly
employed in restricting the amount of mortgages given against the value of real estate.
Although the index records changes in LTV ratio limits affecting real estate transac-
tions, changes in banks’ risk weights associated with LTV ratios are not included as
they do not necessarily change the maximum borrowing capacity for borrowers. The
temporary reduction of maximum loan-to-value ratio from 90% to 80% of the house
sale price in Iceland on 1 July 2006 is an example of use of LTV ratio limits as a
macroprudential tool, and is recorded as a tightening by LTV index.
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4 Bank Specialization
I divide banks into three categories according to their specializations: commercial,
savings, and cooperative banks.
A commercial bank is a type of financial institution which provides services such
as accepting deposits, making business loans, and offering basic investment prod-
ucts. Services provided by commercial banks can be split into two categories such as
core banking services and other functions. Core banking services include accepting
money through various types of deposit accounts, lending money in the form of cash
or documentary (letters of credit, guarantees, performance bonds, securities, etc.),
cash and treasury management for businesses, and private equity financing. Other
functions include collection and clearing cheques, dealing in foreign exchange trans-
actions, purchasing and selling securities, and providing money transfer facility. In
addition to dealing with deposits and loans from the individual members of the public
(retail banking), commercial banks also have corporations or large businesses among
their clientele.
A savings bank is a financial institution whose primary purpose is accepting sav-
ings deposits and paying interest on those deposits. Savings banks keep their focus
on retail banking services such as payments, savings products, credits and insurances
for individuals or small and medium-sized enterprises, and also differ from commercial
banks by their local and regional outreach, which is a result of their broadly decentral-
ized distribution network. Savings banks are smaller than major commercial banks,
and more community-focused. Low-cost funding through government allows them to
offer customers higher savings account yields.
Cooperative banking is retail and commercial banking carried out by coopera-
tives. As such, they are often subject to both banking and cooperative legislation.
Cooperative banks are regional, privately-owned and government-sponsored banks
that make loans to farmer-owned cooperatives, and rural utilities. They are owned
by their customers (cooperative members), and provide services to both members and
non-members. In addition to providing savings and loan services, some cooperative
11
bank might participate in the wholesale markets for bonds, money and equities. As
a result of being traded on public stock markets, many cooperative banks become
partly owned by non-members, and such cooperative banks can be regarded as semi-
cooperative. While local branches of cooperative banks select their own boards of
directors and manage their own operations, strategic decisions are subject to approval
of the central office.
5 Data
The sample consists of yearly data over the period 2000-2014. The initial sample
includes information from an unbalanced panel of more than 7,219 banks from 30
countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Lux-
embourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
5.1 Bank-Level Data
Bank-level data come from Bankscope, a database reporting balance sheet statements
of more than 30,000 worldwide financial institutions which is provided by Bureau
van Dijk. The dependent variables measure the change in bank risk and have bank
and time dimensions, with ∆Riski,t, defined as the change in the risk measure of
bank i at year t. Two different variables accounting for bank risk are employed:
The loan loss reserves ratio
(
≡ loan loss reservesi,tnet loansi,t
)
, and the non-performing loans ratio(
≡ non-performing loansi,tnet loansi,t
)
. “Loan loss reserves” are accounting entries banks make to
cover estimated losses on loans due to defaults and nonpayment. “Non-performing
loans” are the sum of the loans for which the debtors have not made their scheduled
payments for at least 90 days. “Net Loans” represents total loans to customers,
reduced by possible default losses and unearned interest income.
Multiple bank-level variables (BankChari,t) are employed as explanatory vari-
ables: bank size captured by the log of total assets, the percentage of a bank’s portfo-
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lio of assets that is liquid, the bank’s total equity to assets ratio (in percentages), and
the bank’s net income to assets ratio (in percentages). Among these variables, only
the net income to assets ratio systematically picks up significant coefficients, and is
therefore included in the final set of regressions.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Variables: 2000-2014
Variable mean st.dev. min p1 median p99 max
LLR% 3.38 4.95 0.00 0.00 1.94 26.18 41.93
NPL% 5.83 7.46 0.00 0.00 3.26 40.00 46.60
MP 2.30 2.19 -0.09 0.03 2.00 9.50 35.00
∆GDP 1.39 2.47 -14.81 -5.62 1.60 7.20 11.90
TermPr 1.55 1.33 -17.70 -1.74 1.55 4.99 21.75
size 6.41 1.83 -3.47 2.85 6.18 12.21 14.61
liq 20.11 18.84 -5.09 0.80 13.82 91.26 100.00
cap 9.80 10.10 0.00 1.19 7.48 63.64 100.00
inc 0.40 1.86 -66.67 -3.82 0.31 4.13 33.33
Sources: Bankscope and Datastream.
Table 1.1 contains summary statistics for bank characteristics. The mean and
median for loan loss reserves ratio are 3.38% and 1.94%, respectively. These statistics
are 5.83% and 3.26% for the non-performing loans ratio. The log of assets (expressed
in millions of euros) for the average bank in the sample is 6.41. As indicated by the
liquidity ratio, banks keep 20.11% of their assets liquid on average. The capital to
assets ratio is 9.8%. Finally, net income to assets ratio, the measure of profitability,
is 0.4% for the average bank in the sample.
Table 1.2 reports the mean values of the same variables according to the bank
types. We can see that commercial banks have the highest loan loss reserve ratios
and non-performing loans ratios on average, indicating that they have the highest
risk levels. Meanwhile, savings banks have the lowest loss reserve ratios and non-
performing loans ratios on average, making them the safest banks. Furthermore, we
see that commercial banks are also larger, more liquid, better capitalized, and more
profitable than the other two types of banks. Savings banks are the least liquid,
least well capitalized, and least profitable. However, they are larger than cooperative
banks in terms of their total assets.
Table 1.3 contains the correlation matrix for bank characteristics. We can see that
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Table 1.2: Comparison of Mean Values for Commercial, Savings and Cooperative
Banks: 2000-2014
Variable Commercial Savings Cooperative
LLR% 4.57 1.86 3.33
NPL% 7.06 2.93 7.00
MP 2.82 2.02 2.12
∆GDP 1.88 1.43 1.01
TermPr 1.50 1.42 1.68
size 7.06 6.55 5.87
liq 31.85 13.31 16.19
cap 13.39 7.53 8.71
inc 0.54 0.34 0.35
Sources: Bankscope and Datastream.
Table 1.3: Correlation Matrix of Variables: 2000-2014




MP 0.089 -0.018 1.000
0.000 0.009
∆GDP -0.072 -0.215 0.336 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000
TermPr 0.162 0.299 -0.583 -0.462 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
size -0.014 -0.040 -0.039 -0.007 0.025 1.000
0.020 0.000 0.000 0.110 0.000
liq 0.182 0.063 0.121 0.113 -0.044 -0.046 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
cap 0.178 0.178 0.047 0.013 0.036 -0.296 0.273 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
inc -0.184 -0.258 0.032 0.087 -0.076 0.008 0.037 0.125 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.000
Sources: Bankscope and Datastream.
Notes: Three types of banks are included: Commercial, cooperative, savings. p-values in italics.
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the loan loss reserves ratio and the non-performing loans ratio are highly correlated.
They are also positively correlated with liquidity and capital ratios, and negatively
correlated with bank size and profitability. More profitable banks are more liquid and
better capitalized.
5.2 Data on Prudential Instruments
The prudential instruments included in the IBRN Prudential Instruments Database
are: general capital requirements, sector-specific capital buffers, reserve requirements
on local currency denominated accounts, reserve requirements on foreign currency de-
nominated accounts, concentration ratio limits, interbank exposure limits, and limits
on LTV ratios. Although the full database covers 64 countries, I made use of the data
pertaining to the 30 countries in the country set. I also annualized the data which
were given originally in a quarterly format.
5.3 Country-Level Macroeconomic Data
Datastream is the source of all country-level macroeconomic data. The monetary
policy rate MPk,t is the official policy rate set by the monetary authority in country
k at year t. GrowthGDPk,t gives the real GDP growth rate. The term premium
TermPremiumk,t is calculated as the difference between the ten-year government
bond yield and the monetary policy rate.
6 Econometric Specification and Methodology
Policymakers have been employing macroprudential policy tools, however effective-
ness of these tools on bank risk remains an open question. I form the following
hypothesis regarding the relationship between macroprudential policy tools and bank
risk:
Hypothesis: The use of macroprudential policy tools does not affect the change
in bank risk.
The effectiveness of macroprudential policy can also depend on factors such as
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bank type, bank-level variables, and macroprudential policy tools chosen by the pol-
icymakers. The following corollaries follow the above hypothesis:
Corollary 1. The effectiveness of macroprudential policy does not depend on bank
type.
Corollary 2. The effectiveness of macroprudential policy tools does not depend
on bank-level variables.
Corollary 3. The effectiveness of macroprudential policy does not depend on the
choice of tools being employed.
The baseline empirical model is given by the following equation:
∆Riski,t = ηi + χt + βjMPk,t + φjGrowthGDPk,t + ψjTermPremiumk,t
+ θBankChari,t + δMAPPk,t−1 + εi,t (1.1)
∆Riski,t: Change in risk measure for bank i in year t. Risk measures used are
non-performing loans ratio and loan loss reserves ratio.
ηi: Bank fixed effect
χt: Year fixed effect
MPk,t: Monetary policy indicator (official policy rate) for country k in year t.
GrowthGDPk,t: Real GDP growth rate for country k in year t.
TermPremiumk,t: The difference between returns on 10 year government bonds
and the official policy rate for country k in year t.
BankChari,t: Bank characteristics for bank i in year t. The variables included
are log assets (in millions of euros), liquid assets-to-total assets ratio, capital-to-total
assets ratio, and net income-to-assets ratio.
MAPPk,t: Macroprudential policy tool index for country k in year t.
After employing the above baseline model, I determine that profitability, mea-
sured by the net income-to-assets ratio, is the most significant bank characteristic.
Therefore, I run a second regression in which profitability is the only bank charac-
teristic included. Furthermore, I allow profitability to interact with macroprudential
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policy tool index:
∆Riski,t = ηi + χt + βjMPk,t + φjGrowthGDPk,t + ψjTermPremiumk,t
+ θProfitabilityi,t + δMAPPk,t−1 + γ(MAPPk,t−1 ∗ Profitabilityi,t) + εi,t
(1.2)
The expression that is interest to us is the marginal effect of macroprudential policy
given by δ + γProfitabilityi,t.
I employ system GMM to estimate the coefficients in equation (1.1). To simplify
the notation, we can write down the equation to be estimated as:
Yi,t = ηi + χt + α1Ai,t + α2Xi,t + εi,t, (1.3)
where χt denotes common time effects. The bank-specific and the idiosyncratic com-
ponents of the error term, ηi and εi,t, are independently distributed across i, and have
the standard error component structure in which E(ηi) = 0, E(εi,t) = 0, E(ηiεi,t) = 0,
and E(εi,tεi,s) = 0 for s 6= t. Yi.t is the outcome variable which denotes the bank risk.
Ai,t is the vector of bank characteristics that are endogenously determined with the
outcome variable. Just as the bank characteristics affect the bank risk, bank risk
affects other characteristics such as profitability, liquidity, and capital ratio. Xi,t is
the vector of other time varying variables that influence the outcome variable, but do
not suffer from endogeneity.
We can eliminate the bank-specific time-invariant component by taking first dif-
ferences:
∆Yi,t = ∆χt + α1∆Ai,t + α2∆Xi,t + ∆εi,t. (1.4)
System GMM builds a system of two equations – the original equation as well as
the transformed one. To address the endogeneity issue, this approach uses internal
instruments where lagged values of Ai,t are employed as instruments for the equation
in difference, and of its differences for the equation in levels. As Roodman (2006)
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suggests, by introducing first differences as additional instruments and building a
system, system GMM approach can substantially improve efficiency.
7 Results
Table 1.4 contains the regression results between 2000 and 2014 for commercial banks.
The dependent variable is the change in bank risk measured by the change in loan loss
reserves ratio and non-performing loans ratio. In these regressions, I include all four
bank characteristics (net income to assets ratio, capital to assets ratio, liquid assets
ratio and log of total assets), and there is no interaction between macroprudential
policy tools and bank characteristics. Although I have run the regressions for each
macroprudential policy tool, I only report those in which macroprudential policy
tool picks up significant coefficients. We see that there is strong evidence of higher
interest rates corresponding to higher bank risk. This makes sense in economic terms
as higher interest rates can result in higher default rates on loans given by banks.
There is also strong evidence for a negative relationship between real GDP growth
rates and bank risk. As one would expect, banks are performing better in good times
as they would have fewer debtors defaulting. The term premium systematically picks
up positive and significant coefficients, pointing to higher bank risk at times in which
the yield curve has a steeper slope. The bank characteristic that systematically enters
into the equations with a significant coefficient is the income to assets ratio, which
points to a negative relationship between bank profitability and bank risk. There is
some evidence of a positive relationship between the liquidity ratio and bank risk for
commercial banks when the change in NPL ratio is used as the dependent variable.
Among macroprudential policy tools, use of sector-specific capital buffers is associated
with higher risk whereas use of concentration limits is associated with lower risk.
Table 1.5 contains the regression results between 2000 and 2014 for savings banks.
As before, the dependent variable is the change in bank risk measured by the change
in loan loss reserves ratio and non-performing loans ratio. The positive relationship
between interest rates and bank risk which we observed for commercial banks is
present for savings banks as well. Real GDP growth is negatively associated with
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bank risk whereas term premium has a positive association. The net income to
assets still has a negative association with bank risk, but the relationship is not as
robust as it was for commercial banks and cooperative banks. There is evidence that
better capitalized and more liquid banks have lower risk. The log of total assets also
occasionally enters the equations with a significant and negative coefficient, suggesting
larger banks are subject to lower risk. Among macroprudential policy tools, use of
sector-specific capital buffers is associated with higher risk whereas use of interbank
exposure limits is associated with lower risk.
Table 1.6 contains the regression results between 2000 and 2014 for cooperative
banks. Once again, the dependent variable is the change in bank risk measured by
the change in the loan loss reserves ratio and the non-performing loans ratio. These
initial regressions for cooperative banks include all four bank characteristics. However,
there is no interaction between macroprudential policy tools and bank characteristics.
Unlike the cases with commercial and savings banks, the link between interest rates
and bank risk is weak for cooperative banks. Lower interest rates could lead banks to
search for higher yield and hence, higher risk-taking, which could negate the positive
role lower interest rates play by lowering loan defaults. As before, real GDP growth
has a negative coefficient whereas the term premium has a positive one. The net
income to assets systematically enters into the equations with negative coefficients,
and occasionally, the liquidity ratio and the log of total assets attain significant and
negative coefficients. Among macroprudential policy tools, tightening in the form of
capital requirements is associated with higher risk whereas tightening via interbank
exposure limits is associated with lower risk.
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Table 1.4: Regression Results for Commercial Banks: 2000-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(LLR/NL) ∆(NPL/NL) ∆(LLR/NL) ∆(NPL/NL)
Interest Rate 0.24*** 0.38*** 0.18*** 0.35***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06)
RGDP Growth -0.07** -0.16*** -0.09*** -0.22***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Term Premium 0.18*** 0.30*** 0.17*** 0.31***
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06)
Inc to Asset -0.17** -0.46*** -0.40*** -0.54**
(0.08) (0.15) (0.08) (0.22)
Cap to Asset 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Liq to Asset 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log Assets 0.07 0.11 0.03 0.10





No Groups 1,000 786 1,585 1,156
No Obs. 4,895 3,721 8,587 5,739
Sources: Bankscope, Datastream, IBRN Prudential Instruments Database.
Notes: Dependent variables are the change in loan loss reserves over net loans
and in non-performing loans over net loans. Coefficients on time fixed effects
are omitted for conciseness. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.5: Regression Results for Savings Banks: 2000-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(LLR/NL) ∆(NPL/NL) ∆(LLR/NL) ∆(NPL/NL)
Interest Rate 0.13** 0.62*** 0.12*** 0.31***
(0.06) (0.15) (0.02) (0.05)
RGDP Growth -0.04 -0.09*** -0.04*** -0.05**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
Term Premium 0.12*** 0.24*** 0.15*** 0.35***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06)
Inc to Asset -0.16* -0.19 -0.16** -0.14
(0.10) (0.13) (0.07) (0.13)
Cap to Asset -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Liq to Asset 0.00 -0.02*** 0.00 -0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Log Assets -0.07** -0.03 -0.05** 0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)




No Groups 879 832 1,272 1,134
No Obs. 3,781 3,256 6,510 5,206
Sources: Bankscope, Datastream, IBRN Prudential Instruments Database.
Notes: Dependent variables are the change in loan loss reserves over net loans
and in non-performing loans over net loans. Coefficients on time fixed effects
are omitted for conciseness. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.6: Regression Results for Cooperative Banks: 2000-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(LLR/NL) ∆(NPL/NL) ∆(LLR/NL) ∆(NPL/NL)
Interest Rate -0.34 0.11 -0.22 -0.19
(0.25) (0.18) (0.17) (0.23)
RGDP Growth -0.12*** -0.25 0.02 -0.22
(0.04) (0.16) (0.08) (0.14)
Term Premium 0.29*** 0.65*** 0.19*** 0.46***
(0.04) (0.19) (0.06) (0.13)
Inc to Asset -0.86*** -1.65*** -0.87*** -1.63***
(0.14) (0.20) (0.15) (0.20)
Cap to Asset 0.01 0.09 -0.05 -0.06
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
Liq to Asset -0.01 0.01 -0.02** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log Assets 0.04 0.10 -0.14*** -0.12
(0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08)
Cap. Req. 0.54* 2.08***
(0.31) (0.78)
Int. Exp. -0.42*** -0.55***
(0.07) (0.10)
No Groups 1,981 1,787 1,892 1,715
No Obs. 7,994 6,400 7,572 6,121
Sources: Bankscope, Datastream, IBRN Prudential Instruments Database.
Notes: Dependent variables are the change in loan loss reserves over net loans
and in non-performing loans over net loans. Coefficients on time fixed effects
are omitted for conciseness. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.7 repeats the regressions in Table 1.4, but this time by including the net
income to assets ratio as the only bank characteristic, and allowing for an interaction
term between this variable and LTV caps. The findings for macroeconomic variables
continue to hold. Table 8 reports the corresponding average marginal effects of the
macroprudential policy tool at net income to assets ratios varying between -5% and
5%. My findings suggest a differential role for macroprudential policy depending on
bank profitability. Policy tightening in the form of LTV caps increases bank risk
for commercial banks with low profitability whereas the risk decreases for highly
profitable banks. This relationship is visualized in Figure 1.2, panels a and b.
Table 1.9 repeats the regressions in Table 1.5 with a single bank characteristic
(the net income to assets ratio) and with an interaction term between this variable
and concentration limits. The findings for macroeconomic variables remain the same.
Table 1.10 reports the corresponding average marginal effects of macroprudential pol-
icy tools at net income to assets ratios varying between -5% and 5%. The differential
role of macroprudential policy for savings banks is captured by concentration lim-
its. A tightening by using concentration limits is associated with higher bank risk
at low profitability levels, and with lower bank risk at high profitability levels. This
relationship is visualized in Figure 1.3, panels a and b.
Finally, Table 1.11 repeats the regressions in Table 1.6 by including the net income
to assets ratio as the only bank characteristic, and allowing for an interaction term be-
tween this variable and macroprudential policy tools. The findings for macroeconomic
variables remain the same. Table 12 reports the corresponding average marginal ef-
fects of macroprudential policy tools at net income to assets ratios varying between
-5% and 5%. Macroprudential policy plays a differential role for cooperative banks
as well. Interbank exposure limits and concentration limits associate a tightening
with higher bank risk at low profitability levels, and with lower bank risk at high
profitability levels. These relationships are visualized in Figure 1.4, panels a and b






















































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.7: Regression Results for Commercial Banks: 2000-2014
(1) (2)
∆(LLR/NL) ∆(NPL/NL)
Interest Rate 0.06 0.12
(0.05) (0.11)
RGDP Growth -0.14*** -0.40***
(0.05) (0.11)
Term Premium 0.13** 0.22**
(0.06) (0.11)
Inc to Asset -0.28 -0.71***
(0.21) (0.12)
LTV cap 0.35* 0.36***
(0.18) (0.13)
LTV cap×Inc to Asset -0.52* -0.35*
(0.28) (0.19)
No Groups 520 362
No Obs. 2,194 1,441
Sources: Bankscope, Datastream, IBRN Prudential In-
struments Database.
Notes: Dependent variables are the change in loan loss
reserves over net loans and in non-performing loans over
net loans. Coefficients on time fixed effects are omitted
for conciseness. Standard errors are in parentheses. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.8: Average Marginal Effects of LTV Caps for Commercial Banks: 2000-2014
(1) (2)























Sources: Bankscope, Datastream, IBRN Pru-
dential Instruments Database.
Notes: Dependent variables are the change
in loan loss reserves over net loans and in
non-performing loans over net loans. Aver-
age marginal effects of prudential policies are
calculated at net income to assets ratios be-
tween -5% and 5%. Standard errors are in
parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.9: Regression Results for Savings Banks: 2000-2014
(1) (2)
∆(LLR/NL) ∆(NPL/NL)
Interest Rate 0.10*** 0.21***
(0.03) (0.06)
RGDP Growth -0.02 -0.06
(0.02) (0.04)
Term Premium 0.10*** 0.23***
(0.03) (0.05)




Concent.×Inc to Asset -0.82*** -0.17
(0.31) (0.33)
No Groups 1,068 1,011
No Obs. 4,676 4,202
Sources: Bankscope, Datastream, IBRN Prudential In-
struments Database.
Notes: Dependent variables are the change in loan loss
reserves over net loans and in non-performing loans over
net loans. Coefficients on time fixed effects are omitted
for conciseness. Standard errors are in parentheses. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.10: Average Marginal Effects of Concentration Limits for Savings Banks:
2000-2014
(1) (2)























Sources: Bankscope, Datastream, IBRN Pru-
dential Instruments Database.
Notes: Dependent variables are the change
in loan loss reserves over net loans and in
non-performing loans over net loans. Aver-
age marginal effects of prudential policies are
calculated at net income to assets ratios be-
tween -5% and 5%. Standard errors are in
parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.11: Regression Results for Cooperative Banks: 2000-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(LLR/NL) ∆(NPL/NL) ∆(LLR/NL) ∆(NPL/NL)
Interest Rate -0.12 -0.62 -0.74 -0.78
(0.16) (0.62) (0.47) (0.48)
RGDP Growth -0.03 -0.25 -0.12** -0.30***
(0.07) (0.17) (0.05) (0.11)
Term Premium 0.22*** 0.47*** 0.18*** 0.57***
(0.06) (0.15) (0.05) (0.11)
Inc to Asset -0.64*** -1.40*** -0.65*** -1.34***
(0.12) (0.31) (0.14) (0.23)
Int. Exp. 0.05 -0.22**
(0.05) (0.10)




Concent.×Inc to Asset -0.99*** -0.73**
(0.16) (0.30)
No Groups 1,892 1,715 1,959 1,772
No Obs. 7,572 6,121 7,818 6,314
Sources: Bankscope, Datastream, IBRN Prudential Instruments Database.
Notes: Dependent variables are the change in loan loss reserves over net loans and in
non-performing loans over net loans. Coefficients on time fixed effects are omitted for
conciseness. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.12: Average Marginal Effects of Macroprudential Tools for Cooperative
Banks: 2000-2014
Int. Exp. Concent.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inc to Asset ∆(LLR/NL) ∆(NPL/NL) ∆(LLR/NL) ∆(NPL/NL)
-5% 5.35*** 3.35** 5.65*** 4.27***
(0.79) (1.62) (0.90) (1.66)
-4% 4.29*** 2.64** 4.66*** 3.54***
(0.64) (1.31) (0.74) (1.35)
-3% 3.23*** 1.92* 3.67*** 2.81***
(0.49) (1.01) (0.57) (1.05)
-2% 2.17*** 1.21* 2.68*** 2.08***
(0.34) (0.70) (0.41) (0.75)
-1% 1.11*** 0.50 1.69*** 1.34***
(0.19) (0.40) (0.25) (0.44)
0% 0.05 -0.22** 0.70*** 0.61***
(0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14)
1% -1.00*** -0.93*** -0.29*** -0.12
(0.11) (0.23) (0.09) (0.17)
2% -2.06*** -1.64*** -1.28*** -0.85*
(0.26) (0.53) (0.24) (0.47)
3% -3.12*** -2.36*** -2.27*** -1.58**
(0.41) (0.84) (0.40) (0.77)
4% -4.18*** -3.07*** -3.26*** -2.32**
(0.56) (1.15) (0.56) (1.08)
5% -5.24*** -3.78*** -4.25*** -3.05**
(0.71) (1.45) (0.72) (1.38)
Sources: Bankscope, Datastream, IBRN Prudential Instruments Database.
Notes: Dependent variables are the change in loan loss reserves over net
loans and in non-performing loans over net loans. Average marginal effects
of prudential policies are calculated at net income to assets ratios between




The use of macroprudential policy tools became widespread after the 2007-2009 fi-
nancial crisis. However, there is no consensus on their effectiveness. While recent
research documented their effectiveness on lowering credit levels and house prices,
there is also evidence for avoidance and risk-shifting. Using country-level variables
such as total credit amount or house prices might be misleading for evaluating the
stability of the financial system. Following a macroprudential policy tightening, it
is possible for certain financial institutions to increase their risk levels while others
do the opposite. Studying the potential heterogeneity across risk levels of different
institutions requires use of micro level data.
By employing bank level data from 30 European countries for the time period
between 2000 and 2014, I show that interbank exposure limits, concentration limits,
and capital based instruments affect overall risk levels of commercial, savings, and
cooperative banks. While risk levels tend to decrease following a macroprudential
policy tightening through stricter exposure limitations, they tend to increase following
a tightening through the use of capital-based tools. These results point to the fact that
constraining business activities by stricter regulation can lead to a search for yield and
higher risk-taking. Furthermore, I document differential effects of macroprudential
policy depending on banks’ profitability levels. A macroprudential policy tightening
can result in up to a five percentage points increase in the loan loss provisions and
non-performing loans ratios of banks suffering losses. Meanwhile, profitable banks
tend to decrease their risk levels when they are subject to stricter regulation.
Policymakers should pay closer attention to the perverse effects stricter regulation
could have on banks’ risk levels, particularly for banks with lower profitability levels.
They should consider subjecting banks to different restrictions according to their
profitability levels. Future research should focus on examining the channels and
financial activities through which banks increase their risk levels upon facing stricter
regulation. Furthermore, it is worthwhile to study the behavior of non-bank financial






Figure 1.5: Bank Characteristics Over Time
(a) Risk measures and profitability


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DO MONETARY AGGREGATES BELONG IN A MONETARY
MODEL? EVIDENCE FROM THE UK
1 Introduction
Monetary policy is one of the most important tools that economic policy makers
use while attempting to shape the economy, and therefore, it is crucial to successfully
gauge its stance and understand the mechanisms through which it affects the variables
in the economy.
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) documented evidence which showed that money
stock was not only pro-cyclical, but also its movements were leading the movements of
output, suggesting a causal relationship between these two variables. Later studies,
however, showed a weakening correlation structure between the money stock and
output. Combined with the expanding real business cycle (RBC) literature which
attributed the fluctuations in the economy to real variables, this weakening correlation
structure resulted in a diminishing interest in analyzing the behavior of the money
stock. New Keynesian models that were developed later1 studied monetary policy
and its effects by focusing on the role of interest rates, particularly the short-term
nominal interest rate, in line with empirical studies conducted in the 1980s and the
1990s.2 However, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy consists of various
channels, and short-term nominal interest rates play only an indirect role in affecting
the output level.3
The money stock could be an alternative or complementary measure to short-term
1Woodford (2003) provides examples of such models.
2See Estrella and Mishkin (1997), and Stock and Watson (1999) for example.
3Mishkin (2007) summarizes the channels through which monetary policy affects output.
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nominal interest rates for understanding the stance and the role of monetary policy,
but the challenge here is to disentangle money demand and money supply, as they
together determine the level of the money stock. As the proponents of RBC theory
observed, the money stock itself might be affected by movements in output, creating
reverse causality where the business cycle drives the money stock, rather than vice
versa.4
In a recent study, Belongia and Ireland (2016) show that monetary aggregates
do have the ability to explain aggregate fluctuations in the US economy, but only
when measured properly. “Proper measurement” requires using Divisia aggregates
instead of the simple-sum quantities of money. They first show that the correlation
structure that was suggested by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) is still there. By
utilizing a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model, they draw tight links be-
tween monetary policy and economic fluctuations. The user cost (price dual) series of
their preferred money stock measure, Divisia aggregates, enables them to disentangle
money demand’s behavior from that of the money supply. Their analysis suggests
that monetary aggregates should be taken into account while evaluating the stance
of monetary policy and quantifies the contribution of monetary policy to instability
in the US economy between 1967 and 2013.
Three questions naturally arise: Is the discrepancy between the simple-sum and
Divisia quantities present for other economies? Is there further evidence that the
monetary aggregates should be taken into account for understanding the stance of
monetary policy? Can augmenting the measure of monetary policy with monetary
aggregates help in drawing more robust links between monetary policy and economic
fluctuations?
Following Barnett’s critique (1980), many monetary authorities started calculating
Divisia indexes as well as simple-sum measures of money. However, these measures
are mostly meant only for internal use. The Bank of England is one of the few
monetary authorities that makes Divisia indexes publicly available, and this enables
us to study the questions at hand for the UK economy.
4See King and Plosser (1984) and Plosser (1989).
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We can examine the UK data by conducting a SVAR analysis à la Belongia and
Ireland (2016), which would allow us to estimate monetary policy rules and money
demand equations. Such an analysis would answer the question of what type of
monetary policy rule better fits the data. Alternatives would be a Taylor rule without
money (standard in most new-Keynesian models), a Taylor rule with money, and a
money-interest rate rule similar to what Leeper and Roush (2003) and Sims and Zha
(2006) advocate.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of
the literature. Section 3 explains how the Divisia index is constructed, and compares
it with the simple-sum monetary aggregate. Section 4 presents the model and the
employed methodology. Section 5 provides the results from SVAR analysis, and the
last section concludes.
2 Literature Review
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) argue that the interest rate on Federal funds is a good
indicator of monetary policy actions, and therefore, is informative about future move-
ments of real macroeconomic variables. The role of money is minimized once the
Federal funds rate is introduced into the empirical framework. Estrella and Mishkin
(1997) suggest that monetary aggregates can play roles as information variables, as
indicators of policy actions, and as instruments in a policy rule. However, these roles
would require a stable relationship between the aggregates and the final policy tar-
gets. By studying the US data from 1979 to 1995, they show that such a relationship
did not exist in that time period. Stock and Watson (1999) study inflation forecasts
and suggest that there are no gains from including money supply into their analysis.
Belongia (1996) highlights the importance of choosing the right monetary index.
He replicates five studies analyzing the effects of money on aggregate activity, and
shows that in four of the five cases, the qualitative inference in the original study is
reversed when the simple-sum monetary aggregate is replaced by the corresponding
Divisia index. Hendrickson (2014) provides further evidence on the Divisia index
being a better measure of money stock. He suggests that the conclusions of pre-
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vious studies arguing that monetary aggregates are not useful as an intermediate
target for monetary policy or as an information variable might have been driven by
mismeasurement.
Belongia and Ireland (2015) show that Divisia measures of money help in forecast-
ing movements in key macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, the statistical fit of a
structural vector autoregression improves significantly when these measures of money
are included when identifying monetary policy shocks. Their results challenge the
adequacy of conventional models, which focus solely on interest rates. Lastly, Leeper
and Roush (2003) model supply and demand interactions in the money market and
find evidence of an important role for money in the transmission of policy. Their
findings suggest that the money stock and the interest rate jointly transmit mone-
tary policy. Furthermore, for a given exogenous change in the nominal interest rate,
the estimated impact of policy on economic activity increases monotonically with the
response of the money supply.
3 Constructing the Divisia Index
Conventional simple sum monetary aggregates are obtained by simply summing up all
the monetary assets included in an aggregate. Divisia indexes, however, acknowledge
that components of monetary aggregates are imperfect substitutes for each other, and
hence, the growth rates of these indexes are calculated by weighting the growth rates
of the components by their average expenditure shares over the two periods. These
expenditure shares are based on the components’ user cost, which is measured as the
difference between a benchmark interest rate and their own interest rate.
The UK money stock is split into three sectors: household, private non-financial
corporate, and other financial corporate. Following Hancock (2005), who shows that
financial corporations’ Divisia data have high variance and that their volatility may
be telling us little about near-term spending plans, I only use household and private
non-financial corporate sectors’ monetary assets to construct the index.
Monetary data for the UK must be adjusted for breaks which occur when build-
ing societies change classifications to become banks. Hancock (2005) explains that
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leaving data unadjusted would report large flows out of building societies and into
banks. As Bissoondeeal et al. (2010) point out, break-adjusted levels data take this
fact into account, and adjust the prior data by reallocating the past deposits at a
building society that subsequently became a bank into the bank series. As a result, I
use non-break-adjusted levels data and break-adjusted flows to correctly weight each
component asset.
Mi,t denotes the unadjusted amounts outstanding (unadjusted level) of the ith
monetary asset for period t. ∆Mi,t gives the difference between successive amounts
outstanding, and ∆MBAi,t denotes the break-adjusted flows for the ith monetary asset
for period t.
ui,t = (rB,t − ri,t) / (1 + rB,t) is the user cost of the ith asset where ri,t is the own
rate of the asset and rB,t is the rate of return on a non-monetary benchmark asset.















which means that the growth rate of the Divisia index weights the component growth
rates by their average shares. Using the fact that average shares add up to one, I
rearrange the above equation and obtain the following iterative formula for computing









The Bank of England’s household and private non-financial corporate sector Divisia
index includes the following components as of January 2008:
• notes and coins;
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• non interest-bearing deposits;
• interest-bearing bank sight deposits;
• interest-bearing bank time deposits;
• interest-bearing building society sight deposits;
• interest-bearing building society time deposits.
The Bank of England’s household sector data also include Tax Exempt Special Savings
Accounts (TESSAs) and Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs) that were introduced
in 1991 and 1999, respectively. I do not incorporate these assets into the index I
construct as they are primarily a form of savings for households as Hancock (2005)
explains.
The components constituting the Divisia index change over time. Interest-bearing
deposits of the private non-financial corporate sector at building societies are intro-
duced to the index in July 1996. Non interest-bearing deposits in both sectors have
been included in the index since July 1997. Starting from January 1999, household
sector deposits at building societies are broken into two categories as instant access
and notice accounts. The last change for building societies data occurs in January
2008, in which deposits in building societies started to be published as sight and time
deposits for all sectors.
While calculating the user costs of the components of the Divisia index, I use
the quoted interest rates of assets until 1999, and from that year and onward, I use
the effective rates5. As for the benchmark rate, I follow Bissoondeeal et al. (2010)
and adopt an envelope approach similar to that used by the Bank of England. I
add 250 basis points to the three-month Treasury bill rate and compare it with the
interest rates of the assets included in the Divisia index. Every period, the highest
rate provides the benchmark rate for my calculations.
Figure 2.1 plots the year-over-year growth rates of the Divisia and simple sum
series. The two series move in the same direction. However, the discrepancy between
5See the explanatory notes for sectoral deposits and Divisia money in the Bank of England’s
website (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/iadb/notesiadb/divisia.aspx).
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Figure 2.1: Divisia and Simple-Sum Year-over-Year Growth Rate
Comparison in Percentages
Figure 2.2: Differences in Year-over-Year Growth Rates of Divisia and
Simple-Sum Monetary Aggregates, in Percentage Points.
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them can get quite large in certain years. Figure 2.2 shows that the difference between
the year-over-year growth rates of simple sum and Divisia money can be as large as
10 percentage points. This discrepancy highlights the importance of using the right
measure for money and indicates that using the simple sum measures of money instead
of the Divisia index could potentially lead to misleading results.
4 The Model and The Methodology
Following Belongia and Ireland (2016), I employ a vector autoregression (VAR) model
to describe the behavior of six variables: output Yt as measured by real GDP, the
price level Pt as measured by the GDP deflator, moneyMt as measured by the Divisia
index, the short-term nominal interest rate Rt as measured by the official bank rate,
the user cost of money Ut is given by Rt−RMt where RMt is the weighted average return
on different components of money, and finally, commodity prices CPt as measured by
the CRB/BLS spot index. Output, price level, money, and commodity prices enter
our model in log-levels, whereas the short-term nominal interest rate and Divisia user
cost are expressed in terms of decimals.
Stacking the variables at each period into the following 6× 1 vector:
Xt = [Pt Yt CPt Rt Mt Ut]
′ , (2.1)




ΦjXt−j + Σεt, (2.2)
where A is a 6 × 6 matrix of coefficients with ones along the diagonal, µ is a 6 × 1
vector of constant terms, each Φj, j = 1, 2, ..., q, is a 6×6 matrix of slope coefficients,
Σ is a 6 × 6 matrix with standard deviations of the structural disturbances along
its diagonals and zeros elsewhere, and εt is a 6 × 1 vector of serially and mutually
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uncorrelated structural disturbances, normally distributed with zero means and
Eεtε
′
t = I. (2.3)
The reduced form associated with equations (2.2) and (2.3) is
Xt = ν +
q∑
j=1
ΓjXt−j + ηt, (2.4)
where the constant term ν = A−1µ is 6× 1, each Γj = A−1Φj, j = 1, 2, ..., q, is a 6× 6




t = Ω. (2.5)
The structural and reduced-form disturbances are linked via
A−1Σεt = ηt,
such that
A−1ΣΣ′(A−1)′ = Ω. (2.6)
As the covariance matrix Ω for the reduced-form innovations has 21 distinct elements,
at least 15 restrictions must be imposed on the 36 elements of A and Σ that have not
been normalized to equal to zero or one in order to identify the structural disturbances
from the information in the reduced form.
In order to solve the identification problem, I follow Sims (1980) and assume that
A is lower triangular. If the variables are ordered as in (2.1), then the fourth element of
εt can be interpreted as the monetary policy shock εmpt , which suggests that aggregate
price level, output, and commodity prices respond with a lag to monetary policy and
the Bank of England adjusts the official bank rate contemporaneously in response to
the movements in these variables according to the equation




where aij denotes the coefficient from row i and column j of A and σ44 is the fourth
element along the diagonal of Σ. The terms involving the constant µ and lagged
values Xt−j in (2.2) are suppressed in (2.7) in order to focus on the contemporaneous
links between variables. Similarly, the fifth row of the triangular model yields to the
following equation
a51Pt + a52Yt + a53CPt + a54Rt +Mt = σ55ε
md
t , (2.8)
which can be interpreted as a money demand equation, linking money demand to
the price level, output, commodity prices, and the short-term interest rate as the
opportunity cost of holding money. Equation (2.7) depicts the official bank rate
being targeted without any reference to the money stock, and (2.8) assumes that
money stock expands and contracts to accommodate the shifts in money demand for
the given interest rate.
I make use of a second, alternative identification scheme, in which money stock
plays a larger role in the making and transmission of monetary policy. In this scheme,
A is allowed to take the following non-triangular form:
1 0 0 0 0 0
a21 1 0 0 0 0
a31 a32 a33 a34 a35 a36
0 0 0 1 a45 0
−1 a52 0 0 1 a56
−a65 0 0 a64 a65 1

. (2.9)
In the alternative identification, the first two rows of (2.9) are similar to the triangular
identification, in which aggregate price level and output respond to the other shocks
hitting the economy with a one-period lag. Row three of (2.9) indicate that commod-
ity prices are assumed to react immediately to every shock hitting the economy.
The monetary system, in particular, is modeled by the last three rows of (2.9).
The monetary policy rule described by row four is similar to rules employed in Sims
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(1986), and in Leeper and Roush (2003):
Rt + a45Mt = σ44ε
mp
t . (2.10)
Such a monetary policy rule associates a monetary policy shock with simultaneous
movements in the interest rate and the nominal money supply. For a positive a45 coef-
ficient, such a rule associates monetary policy tightening with immediately increasing
interest rates and a decreasing money stock.
This policy rule can be expanded so that it includes prices and output, which
would mean that the interest rate immediately responds to changes not only in the
money supply, but also in the price level and output:
a41Pt + a42Yt +Rt + a45Mt = σ44ε
mp
t . (2.11)
Row five in (2.9) suggests a money demand equation of the following form:
a52Yt + (Mt − Pt) + a56Ut = σ55εmdt , (2.12)
which links the real value of Divisia index to output and the user cost as the associated
price.
The behavior of the private financial institutions can be characterized by row six
of (2.9):
a64Rt + a65(Mt − Pt) + Ut = σ66εmst , (2.13)
which suggests that both the official bank rate and the quantity of real monetary
services created get passed along to user cost.
I employ the maximum likelihood method to estimate the described SVAR model
as outlined by Hamilton (1994) and Lutkepohl (2006). Fully efficient estimates of
the reduced-form constant and slope coefficients in (2.4) can be obtained by applying
ordinary least squares, equation by equation. Then, I need to compute the estimate
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of the reduced-form innovations’ covariance matrix as suggested by (2.5):






By maximizing the following concentrated log-likelihood function, I obtain estimates
for the parameters of A and Σ:
−3T ln(2pi) + (T/2) ln (|A|2)− (T/2) ln (|ΣΣ′|)− (T/2){[A′(ΣΣ′)−1A] Ω̂} .
This approach can be employed for estimating both the over-identified case suggested
by (2.9) and the just-identified triangular model (although, for the latter case, the
usual approach of using the Cholesky decomposition for Ω̂ would yield the same
result).
5 SVAR Results
Below is a timeline for official monetary policy regimes pursued by the Bank of Eng-
land, and recessions that took place in the UK:
• July 1976 to April 1979: Monetary targeting (M3)
• May 1979 to February 1987: Monetary targeting
• 1980:1 - 1981:1 Recession
• March 1987 to September 1990: Informal linking of the pound to the Deutsche
Mark
• 1990:3 - 1991:3 Recession
• October 1990 to September 1992: Membership in the Exchange Rate Mecha-
nism
• October 1992 to April 1997: Inflation targeting prior to the operational inde-
pendence of the Bank of England
• 2008:2 - 2009:2 Recession
50
Running the SVAR analysis for different samples and factoring in the above develop-
ments show that the UK data can be split into two samples: An early sample that
spans 1978:Q3 to 1990:Q1, and a recent sample that spans 1993:Q1-2011:Q3. I ex-
clude the time period in between as the data include too much noise due to the UK’s
exchange rate mechanism membership in that time period. Similarly, the period after
2011:Q3 is not included as it was a tumultuous time period in which unconventional
monetary policy tools such as quantitative easing were applied.
Estimated monetary policy, money demand and monetary system equations are
provided in Table 2.1 to Table 2.4. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide the regression results
for the early sample when the data are in log levels and in growth rates, respectively.
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 do the same for the recent sample. I use a likelihood ratio test to
see whether including monetary aggregates into the monetary policy rule improves
the fit6. The restriction of excluding the monetary aggregates from the monetary
policy rule given by equation (2.11) is rejected at the 99 percent confidence level
for all samples. The constraint of excluding prices and output from equation (2.11),
however, does not cause much deterioration in the model’s fit. These results point to
a monetary policy rule including the monetary aggregates.
The results in Table 2.1 to Table 2.4 suggest that variables other than the money
stock (i.e., output and prices) do not enter the monetary policy equation significantly.
As a result, there is little support for a Taylor-rule depiction of UK monetary policy
in either sample period. Instead, interest rate-money rule provides the preferred
specification. The estimates suggest that the interest rate responds positively to
increasing levels of the money stock. Money demand usually increases with income
level, and the user cost of money increases with interest rates. As one would expect,
money demand falls when the cost of money increases.
An important difference between the early and recent samples is the reaction of the
interest rate to the stock of money, as can be seen from the monetary policy equations.
The coefficient on money stock is much larger in the early sample compared to the
6The test is conducted by multiplying the difference of the maximized likelihood values with 2,
and then comparing it with the critical chi-squared value, for which the degrees of freedom is equal
to the number of restrictions.
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recent sample. However, in terms of significance, the coefficient on money stock in
monetary policy equation fares better after 1993.
Impulse responses in percentage points to one-standard deviation monetary policy
shocks are provided in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. Since interest rate-money rule is the
preferred specification, I compare the impulse responses from the interest rate-money
rule to those obtained from the triangular model. There are two established puzzles in
the VAR literature that need to be addressed here. Following a positive shock to the
interest rates, it is common to observe an increase in the price level (price puzzle) and
an increase in the money stock (liquidity puzzle). The estimated monetary policy rules
for both samples suggest that incorporating monetary aggregates into the monetary
policy rule helps to solve both puzzles and following a monetary policy shock, price
level and monetary aggregates behave more in line with what macroeconomic theory
suggests.
6 Conclusion
It is very important to successfully gauge the stance of monetary policy and under-
stand the mechanisms through which it affects the variables in the economy. In order
to achieve these goals, we can use the money stock as an alternative or complemen-
tary measure to short-term nominal interest rates, as long as the stock of money is
properly measured.
I start with constructing the Divisia index for the United Kingdom for the period
between 1978 and 2011. I estimate the monetary policy equation for the early and
recent samples by employing structural vector autoregression. My results show that
there is little support for a Taylor-rule depiction of UK monetary policy, and sug-
gest the use of interest rate-money rule as the preferred formulation for the conduct
of monetary policy. Inclusion of the (correct) measure of quantity of money into
the monetary policy equation, and disentangling money supply from money demand
remedy the price and liquidity puzzles: two well-established puzzles in the VAR lit-
erature. Furthermore, I show that the reaction of the interest rate to the stock of
money was quite strong for the period between 1978 and 1990, but this relationship
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weakens from 1993 and onwards. The findings of this chapter point to the informa-
tional content embedded in monetary aggregates, and suggest that they should be
taken into account while evaluating monetary policy.
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Table 2.1: Maximum Likelihood Estimates from SVARs
Data in Log Levels, Early Sample: 1978:3 - 1990:1
A. Triangular Identification L=2856.2
Monetary Policy R = 0.11P - 0.19Y - 0.00CP σ = 0.0070
(0.26) (0.27) (0.03) (0.0004)
Money Demand M = 0.42P + 0.48Y + 0.05R + 0.02CP σ = 0.0077
(0.26) (0.28) (0.15) (0.04) (0.0005)
B. Interest Rate-Money Rule L=2852.2
Monetary Policy R = 2.19M σ = 0.0143
(1.64) (0.0036)
Money Demand M - P = 0.88Y - 11.97U σ = 0.0873
(1.75) (20.43) (0.0708)
Monetary System U = 0.64R + 0.17(M-P) σ = 0.0145
(0.07) (0.06) (0.0040)
C. Taylor Rule with Money L=2853.7
Monetary Policy R = - 0.83P - 1.23Y + 2.46M σ = 0.0157
(1.25) (1.37) (2.54) (0.0044)
Money Demand M - P = 0.92Y - 15.88U σ = 0.0776
(2.17) (48.91) (0.0577)
Monetary System U = 0.64R + 0.16(M-P) σ = 0.0147
(0.08) (0.06) (0.0041)
D. Taylor Rule without Money L=2823.9
Monetary Policy R = 0.11P - 0.18Y σ = 0.0070
(0.25) (0.26) (0.0004)
Money Demand M - P = 0.75Y - 0.01U σ = 0.0100
(0.25) (0.34) (0.0007)
Monetary System U = 0.46R + 0.10(M-P) σ = 0.0050
(0.05) (0.05) (0.0005)
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Table 2.2: Maximum Likelihood Estimates from SVARs
Data in Growth Rates, Early Sample: 1978:3 - 1990:1
A. Triangular Identification L=1193.2
Monetary Policy R = 0.19P - 0.05Y + 0.00CP σ = 0.0089
(0.18) (0.18) (0.03) (0.0008)
Money Demand M = 0.15P + 0.14Y - 0.08R - 0.01CP σ = 0.0075
(0.19) (0.18) (0.16) (0.03) (0.0007)
B. Interest Rate-Money Rule L=1191.3
Monetary Policy R = 3.70M σ = 0.0222
(3.58) (0.0113)
Money Demand M - P = 2.24Y - 23.62U σ = 0.0409
(4.40) (48.31) (0.0264)
Monetary System U = 0.66R + 0.16(M-P) σ = 0.0099
(0.08) (0.06) (0.0027)
C. Taylor Rule with Money L=1193.2
Monetary Policy R = - 0.40P - 0.61Y + 4.02M σ = 0.0206
(1.07) (1.12) (4.69) (0.0085)
Money Demand M - P = 2.49Y - 26.97U σ = 0.0420
(5.84) (70.49) (0.0248)
Monetary System U = 0.68R + 0.16(M-P) σ = 0.0099
(0.08) (0.06) (0.0027)
D. Taylor Rule without Money L=1172.9
Monetary Policy R = 0.19P - 0.05Y σ = 0.0089
(0.18) (0.18) (0.0008)
Money Demand M - P = 0.48Y - 0.60U σ = 0.0102
(0.22) (0.48) (0.0010)
Monetary System U = 0.43R + 0.13(M-P) σ = 0.0050
(0.05) (0.05) (0.0006)
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Table 2.3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates from SVARs
Data in Log Levels, Recent Sample: 1993:1 - 2011:3
A. Triangular Identification L=1027.5
Monetary Policy R = 0.10P + 0.03Y + 0.02CP σ = 0.0020
(0.07) (0.10) (0.01) (0.0002)
Money Demand M = 0.38P - 0.24Y - 0.27R + 0.03CP σ = 0.0050
(0.19) (0.26) (0.29) (0.02) (0.0005)
B. Interest Rate-Money Rule L=1021.7
Monetary Policy R = 0.62M σ = 0.0074
(0.30) (0.0079)
Money Demand M - P = - 0.21Y - 12.81U σ = 0.0171
(0.63) (5.78) (0.0084)
Monetary System U = 0.51R + 0.06(M-P) σ = 0.0083
(0.06) (0.02) (0.0052)
C. Taylor Rule with Money L=1022.5
Monetary Policy R = - 0.33P + 0.31Y + 1.19M σ = 0.0426
(0.51) (0.45) (1.23) (0.3015)
Money Demand M - P = - 0.27Y - 21.12U σ = 0.0148
(0.97) (18.57) (0.0066)
Monetary System U = 0.55R + 0.04(M-P) σ = 0.0086
(0.07) (0.03) (0.0053)
D. Taylor Rule without Money L=1019.1
Monetary Policy R = 0.10P + 0.04Y σ = 0.0020
(0.08) (0.10) (0.0002)
Money Demand M - P = - 0.13Y - 1.10U σ = 0.0055
(0.25) (0.34) (0.0006)
Monetary System U = 0.32R + 0.02(M-P) σ = 0.0023
(0.04) (0.02) (0.0005)
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Table 2.4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates from SVARs
Data in Growth Rates, Recent Sample: 1993:1 - 2011:3
A. Triangular Identification L=897.3
Monetary Policy R = 0.07P + 0.04Y + 0.02CP σ = 0.0015
(0.07) (0.09) (0.01) (0.0002)
Money Demand M = 0.37P - 0.14Y - 0.35R + 0.04CP σ = 0.0045
(0.18) (0.22) (0.29) (0.02) (0.0005)
B. Interest Rate-Money Rule L=891.5
Monetary Policy R = 0.68M σ = 0.0078
(0.34) (0.0092)
Money Demand M - P = - 0.09Y - 12.51U σ = 0.0331
(0.53) (5.18) (0.0318)
Monetary System U = 0.56R + 0.05(M-P) σ = 0.0074
(0.07) (0.02) (0.0035)
C. Taylor Rule with Money L=894.1
Monetary Policy R = - 0.54P + 0.28Y + 1.69M σ = 0.0037
(0.95) (0.56) (2.42) (0.0018)
Money Demand M - P = - 0.19Y - 22.30U σ = 0.0458
(0.90) (20.38) (0.0569)
Monetary System U = 0.60R + 0.04(M-P) σ = 0.0071
(0.07) (0.03) (0.0034)
D. Taylor Rule without Money L=882.2
Monetary Policy R = 0.09P + 0.05Y σ = 0.0016
(0.07) (0.09) (0.0002)
Money Demand M - P = 0.04Y - 1.18U σ = 0.0072
(0.24) (0.95) (0.0016)









































































































































































































































































































































DETERMINANTS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES
1 Introduction
IMF policy requires an assessment on the degree of sustainability of the member’s
public debt before providing access to its financial resources. The Fund staff classi-
fies a country’s public debt into one of three zones: unsustainable (“red zone” cases),
sustainable with high probability (“green zone”) or sustainable but not with high prob-
ability (“gray zone”). The debt sustainability framework1 used by the Fund identifies
risks to debt sustainability, but it does not provide exact probabilities that could be
used for Fund lending decisions. IMF staff have relied on judgment to make an overall
assessment of the probability of debt being sustainable. Analytical tools that analyze
probabilities of sustainable debt in an objective and systematic way can provide guid-
ance and complement judgment. One analytical tool that has been employed is the
noise-to-signal (NTS) approach where signals from different debt burden and liquidity
indicators are weighed based on their predictive power, and then used for developing
a “risk index.” In this chapter, I develop an alternative/complementary probit model
that estimates the probability of default as a function of a set of debt burden indi-
cators and other country-specific variables. By using the estimation results, I first
derive an indicative cutoff probability of debt distress level. Then, I calculate the
corresponding thresholds for debt variables, above which countries are predicted to
experience an episode of debt distress.
The econometric model improves our understanding of sovereign debt distress
events, and strengthens the toolkit for crisis prevention. The existing NTS approach is
1See IMF Staff Guidance Note for Public Debt Sustainability Analysis in Market-Access Countries
(2013) for details.
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a univariate method and therefore ignores correlation between explanatory variables.
The developed probit model is multivariate, statistically-based, and allows for a wide
range of explanatory variables. I use the probit model to study what types of debt
matter, and what country characteristics contribute to debt distress.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of
the literature on the determinants of sovereign debt crises. Section 3 explains how
the variable of interest (the dependent variable) is constructed. Section 4 provides
information on explanatory variables and data. Section 5 summarizes the regres-
sion results. Section 6 explains how the optimal cutoff probability and indicative
thresholds for debt variables are determined. The last section provides concluding
remarks.
2 Literature Review
The literature has consistently shown that the level of indebtedness matters for debt
distress. Institutions, history of debt distress, and short-term debt-to-reserves ratio
are also shown to matter for predicting debt distress. The role of primary deficit
and debt servicing costs depend on country characteristics such as being an advanced
economy or an emerging market.
Manasse and Roubini (2009) find that most debt crises can be classified into
three categories: i) episodes of insolvency (high debt and high inflation) or debt
unsustainability due to high debt and illiquidity; ii) episodes of illiquidity, in which
there are large stocks of short-term liabilities relative to foreign reserves; and iii)
episodes of macro and exchange rate weaknesses, which could be generated by large
overvaluation and negative growth shocks.
Kohlscheen (2007) shows that presidential democracies are roughly five times more
likely than parliamentary democracies to default on external debt. He argues that the
confidence requirement creates a credible link between economic policies and the ex-
ecutive’s political survival in parliamentary democracies. This, in turn, strengthens
opportunistic politicians’ commitment to repayment. As a country’s form of gov-
ernment is usually chosen at the time of independence and is highly persistent over
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time, institutions can explain the link between developing countries’ debt policies
and their individual histories. Similarly, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2009) show
that in democracies, a parliamentary system or sufficient checks and balances pre-
vent defaults on external debt when economic fundamentals or liquidity are strong
enough. High stability and tenure play a similar role for default on domestic debt in
dictatorships.
Reinhart et al. (2003) argue that history matters. A country’s past record at
meeting its debt obligations and managing its macroeconomy is useful for forecasting
its ability to sustain moderate to high levels of indebtedness. They introduce the
concept of “debt intolerance.” Debt-intolerant countries (usually, emerging market
economies) experience extreme duress at debt levels that are quite manageable for
advanced industrial economies. They tend to have weak fiscal structures and weak
financial systems. The situation is exacerbated by default as it makes debt-intolerant
countries more prone to future default.
Cotarelli et al. (2010) stress the differences between advanced economies and
emerging markets. They highlight that when it comes to default, the challenge for
the advanced economies stems from large primary deficits, not from a high average
interest rate on debt. In contrast, the emerging markets that defaulted in recent
decades did so primarily as a result of high debt servicing costs, often in the context
of major external shocks.
3 Debt Distress Events
“Debt distress events” data are based on “Fiscal Crises” by Gerling et al. (2017). The
following events are considered as a “debt distress event”:
• Credit events: This type of events include outright defaults, restructuring, and
rescheduling of sovereign debt. As a result of these events, the sovereign reduces
the present value of its debt owed to official or other creditors. Small-scale
technical defaults which is less than 0.2 percent of GDP are excluded.
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• High-access IMF financial arrangements: Instead of outright default or taking
other exceptional measures to reduce their debt, countries can obtain large
official financing in the form of financial support from the IMF. This support
is usually for countries that are experiencing balance of payments problems
and unable to make international payments. Usually, the inability to meet its
financial obligations is driven by fiscal distress. This criterion captures any year
under an IMF financial arrangement in which fiscal adjustment is stated as a
program objective, and the country gains access to funds above 100 percent of
its quota.
• Loss of market confidence: This criterion captures any year with extreme market
pressures in which a sovereign either loses market access and/or experiences a
yield spike. “Loss of market access” means the loss of ability to raise funds
from the international capital markets either in the form of contracting loans
or issuing securities to raise debt. A “yield spike” is when the sovereign bond
spreads exceeds 1,000 basis points (bps) for the spreads, which is widely seen
as a psychological barrier for market participants’.2
• Steep increase in domestic arrears: A steep increase of “other account payables”
(OAP) is used as a proxy for domestic arrears. When the OAP-to-GDP ratio
grows more than 1 percentage point per year, this is interpreted as an implicit
domestic public debt default.
I group the “debt distress events” into “debt distress episodes.” Debt distress
events usually last longer than a year, and consecutive debt distress events together
constitute a debt distress episode. Since I am interested in building an econometric
model that predicts the start of a crisis, I only include the start year of a debt distress
episode into the analysis. If there is a one year gap between two debt distress events,
I treat these events as part of the same debt distress episode. If there is no debt
distress event in a year, and that year is not in between two debt distress event years,
then that year is also not part of a debt distress episode. Table 3.1 provides an
2See Pescatori and Sy (2004), and Baldacci et al. (2011).
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example of how I construct debt distress episodes based on debt distress events, and
then include them into the analysis. In the given hypothetical example, the country
experiences debt distress events from 2010 to 2013, and then again in 2015. This
whole period is treated as one debt distress episode. Note that even though there
is no debt distress event in 2014, because that year is in between two debt distress
events, I still consider it as part of the same debt distress episode. Since I am only
interested in predicting the start of debt distress episodes, from the years belonging
in the debt distress episode, I only include 2010 into the analysis. The country does
not experience debt distress events in 2008 and 2009, thus I include them into the
analysis as non-debt distress episodes.










Figure 3.1 gives the distribution of debt distress events in the sample according
to different criteria. There are 52 country-years in the sample in which there is a
debt distress event according to the credit criterion. There are 31 country-years in
which there is a debt distress event as high-access IMF financial arrangements took
place. 33 country-years indicate debt distress events due to loss of market confidence,
and finally 5 country-years indicate debt distress in the form of a steep increase in
domestic arrears.
4 Explanatory Variables and Data
I have examined several variables as predictors of sovereign debt distress episodes.
Broadly speaking, these variables fall under three categories.
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Figure 3.1: Number of Debt Distress Events According to Different Criteria
(1) Debt indicators: Public debt-to-GDP ratio, 3-year change in public debt-to-
GDP ratio, external public debt-to-GDP ratio, external debt of the bank-
ing sector-to-GDP ratio, gross financing needs (GFN)-to-GDP ratio, primary
deficit-to-GDP ratio.
(2) Macro variables: Real GDP growth, inflation, international reserves-to-imports
ratio, 3-year change in private credit-to-GDP ratio, real exchange rate overval-
uation, global real GDP growth.
(3) Country characteristics: Per capita real GDP, dummy variable indicating a
small state, dummy variable indicating currency union membership.
The sample includes 118 market access countries for the time period between 1990
and 2015. There are 80 country-years in which a debt distress episode started, and
1200 non-debt distress episode country-years. As explained in the previous section,
debt distress episodes data are based on Gerling et al. (2017). WEO is the main
data source for explanatory variables. Additional data sources for public debt data is
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Abbas et al. (2011), Haver Analytics and IMF staff reports for external debt, Mauro
et al. (2015) for primary and fiscal deficits, IFS for international reserves and credit
data.
Table 3.2 provides the correlation matrix for select variables. As one would expect,
there is a significant and high correlation between public debt-to-GDP and external
public debt-to-GDP ratios. Furthermore, GFN-to-GDP ratio is highly correlated with
public debt-to-GDP and primary deficit-to-GDP ratios.
Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix
Public debt ∆ in P debt Ext pub debt Ext bank debt Pri deficit GFN
Public debt 1.00
∆ in P debt 0.19 1.00
Ext pub debt 0.65 0.04 1.00
Ext bank debt 0.12 0.10 0.15 1.00
Pri deficit 0.15 0.14 0.22 -0.01 1.00
GFN 0.54 0.15 0.35 0.11 0.45 1.00
Figure 3.2 shows the density functions for public debt-to-GDP and external public
debt-to-GDP ratios. Dashed lines correspond to country-years in which countries
experience debt distress events. Solid lines correspond to non-crisis country-years. In
both cases, the distributions are more right skewed for non-crisis years, indicating the
lower (higher) debt ratios for non-crisis (crisis) country-years.
Similarly, Figure 3.3 shows the density functions for per capita real GDP and
inflation levels. As before, dashed lines correspond to country-years in which countries
experience debt distress events, and solid lines correspond to non-crisis country-years.
We can see that crisis country-years have lower per capita real GDP and higher
inflation levels.
Figure 3.4 plots the median values of select variables over time. Time 0 corre-
sponds to the year in which debt distress episode starts. The figure traces the behavior
of the selected variables before the debt distress event and also afterwards. Public
debt-to-GDP ratio and primary deficit-to-GDP ratio start to increase right before the
crisis and peaks at the crisis year. Although the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio starts
to decrease right after the crisis, the public debt-to-GDP ratio continues to increase
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and stays high for an extended time period. Countries experience a real exchange
rate appreciation and a build up in their credit-to-GDP ratios long before the crisis
starts. Once the crisis takes place, these ratios start to decline gradually.
5 Methodology and Results
In order to analyze the determinants of sovereign debt distress episodes, I estimate a
probit model:
Pr(DD = 1|X, d) = Φ(Xβ + dγ) (3.1)
where Pr(.) is the probability function; DD is a binary variable that takes the value
of 1 if the country is experiencing debt distress episode and zero otherwise; Φ is the
standard normal cumulative distribution function; β’s and γ are the coefficients to be
estimated; X is the vector of explanatory variables; d is the debt variable of interest.
Table 3.3 presents the baseline regression results. Notice that the coefficients give
the average marginal effects. The original probit coefficients are provided in Table 3.6
in the appendix. Column 1 shows that the public debt-to-GDP ratio, inflation level,
per capita real GDP, international reserves-to-imports ratio, 3-year change in credit-
to-GDP ratio, real exchange rate overvaluation, and global growth rate are significant
variables for predicting sovereign debt distress episodes. In column 2, I add the 3-year
change in public debt-to-GDP ratio as an explanatory variable. The results do not
change substantially. In columns 3 and 4, I add external public debt-to-GDP and
external debt of the banking sector-to-GDP ratios, respectively. Both external debt
ratios are significant predictors of debt distress episodes. However, once external debt
measures are included, the public debt-to-GDP ratio loses its significance, which is
not surprising given the correlation between different debt indicators.
Column 1 of Table 3.4 repeats the final regression in Table 3.3. It includes two
additional specifications in which dummy variables for being a small state and being
a currency union member are introduced (separately). The results suggest that small
states and currency union members are significantly more likely to experience debt
distress episodes.
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Table 3.3: Baseline Results: Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Public debt/GDP)t−1 0.078*** 0.072*** 0.022 0.016
3-year ∆ in (Public debt/GDP)t−1 0.050 0.076* 0.075*
(Ext public debt/GDP)t−1 0.128*** 0.117**
(Ext bank debt/GDP)t−1 0.050***
(Primary deficit/GDP)t−1 0.107 0.051 0.040 0.020
Real GDP growtht−1 0.009 0.031 0.114 0.098
Inflationt−1 0.089** 0.095** 0.101** 0.096**
Per capita real GDPt−1 -0.363*** -0.364*** -0.384*** -0.536***
(Int reserve/imports)t−1 -0.094** -0.088** -0.070* -0.077*
3-year ∆ in (Credit/GDP)t−1 0.166*** 0.167*** 0.172*** 0.117**
Real exc rate overvaluationt−1 0.106* 0.100* 0.127* 0.121*
Global growtht -0.891* -0.927* -1.020* -1.050**
N 1280 1280 1280 1280
Pseudo R-sq 0.128 0.130 0.145 0.157
Obs with dep 1 80 80 80 80
Table 3.4: Results with Dummies: Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3)
(Public debt/GDP)t−1 0.016 0.004 0.016
3-year ∆ in (Public debt/GDP)t−1 0.075* 0.068* 0.074*
(Ext public debt/GDP)t−1 0.117** 0.128*** 0.100**
(Ext bank debt/GDP)t−1 0.050*** 0.058*** 0.058***
(Primary deficit/GDP)t−1 0.020 0.048 -0.007
Real GDP growtht−1 0.098 0.129 0.134
Inflationt−1 0.096** 0.096** 0.102**
Per capita real GDPt−1 -0.536*** -0.558*** -0.659***
(Int reserve/imports)t−1 -0.077* -0.060 -0.068*
3-year ∆ in (Credit/GDP)t−1 0.117** 0.111** 0.121***
Real exc rate overvaluationt−1 0.121* 0.123** 0.122*
Global growtht -1.050** -1.070** -1.020**
Small state 4.150***
Currency uniont−1 5.040**
N 1280 1280 1280
Pseudo R-sq 0.157 0.168 0.164
Obs with dep 1 80 80 80
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Table 3.5: Results with GFN: Average Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Public debt/GDP)t−1 0.026 -0.014 -0.034 -0.016
3-year ∆ in (Public debt/GDP)t−1 0.060 0.068* 0.060 0.062
(Ext public debt/GDP)t−1 0.142*** 0.164*** 0.163*** 0.133**
(Ext bank debt/GDP)t−1 0.035*** 0.033** 0.040*** 0.040***
(Primary deficit/GDP)t−1 0.219
(GFN/GDP)t−1 0.123*** 0.161*** 0.121***
Real GDP growtht−1 0.042 0.046 0.147 0.058
Inflationt−1 0.266*** 0.269*** 0.281*** 0.271***
Per capita real GDPt−1 -0.383*** -0.357*** -0.353*** -0.442***
(Int reserve/imports)t−1 -0.018 -0.016 -0.004 -0.015
3-year ∆ in (Credit/GDP)t−1 0.207*** 0.211*** 0.208*** 0.198***
Real exc rate overvaluationt−1 0.084 0.082 0.077 0.085
Global growtht -0.813 -0.865* -0.917** -0.850*
Small state 4.950***
Currency uniont−1 3.460
N 802 802 802 802
Pseudo R-sq 0.205 0.212 0.233 0.215
Obs with dep 1 40 40 40 40
Table 3.5 makes use of gross financing needs instead of the primary deficit. While
the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio does not seem to be a significant predictor of
sovereign debt distress episodes, the GFN-to-GDP ratio has a positive and significant
coefficient. Countries with larger gross financing needs are more likely to experience
debt distress episodes.
6 Deriving a Probability Threshold
After estimating the probit model, the optimal cutoff probability is calculated in four
steps:
(i) using the estimated model and data for each episode, calculate the fitted prob-
ability of debt distress, P̂ ;
(ii) classify episodes as distress or non-distress by comparing P̂ with candidate
cutoff probabilities, P¯ , such that a distress (non-distress) episode is predicted
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correctly whenever P̂ ≥ P¯ (P̂ < P¯ );
(iii) compare the classification generated in (ii) with actual outcomes to determine
type I (failure to predict distress that actually occurred) and type II (incorrectly
predicting distress when it did not occur) errors; and
(iv) select the optimal cutoff probability, P̂ ∗, that minimizes a loss function equal
to the weighted sum of type I and type II errors.
The loss function can be written as follows:
Loss function = ω Type I error + (1− ω) Type II error
Type I error (t1): Missed calls
Type II error (t2): False alarms
Once we have the optimal probability cutoff, we can invert the probit equation to




where XM is the vector of median values of explanatory variables.
I calculate that for ω = 0.5, the optimal cutoff probability is p∗ = 0.08, and
the corresponding type I and type II errors are equal to t1 = 0.24 and t2 = 0.25,
respectively. By inverting the probit equation, I calculate the indicative thresholds for
external public debt-to-GDP ratio, and for the 3-year change in public debt-to-GDP
ratio. The thresholds are 54%, and 26 percentage points, respectively. Figure 3.5 plots
the predicted probabilities for the debt distress episodes in the sample and the optimal
cutoff probability. Debt distress episodes in which the predicted probabilities exceed
the optimal cutoff probability are successfully captured by the model. Debt distress
episodes in which the predicted probabilities stay below the optimal cutoff probability
correspond to type I error (failure to predict distress that actually occurred).
I also calculate the indicative thresholds for external public debt-to-GDP ratio,
and for the 3-year change in public debt-to-GDP ratio for countries experiencing low
or high inflation. When I use the 5th percentile for inflation (−0.4%) instead of the
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median value (4%), the indicative thresholds become 59%, and 31 percentage points,
respectively. When I use the 95th percentile for inflation (21%), these thresholds be-
come 35%, and 7 percentage points. These results suggest that countries experiencing
higher inflation levels have lower debt tolerance.
7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I develop an econometric model to identify the main factors con-
tributing to sovereign debt crises. The model takes into account a broad range of
debt distress drivers, including debt levels and gross financing needs, but also com-
position of the debt, macroeconomic fundamentals, and country characteristics such
as whether the country is a small state or a member of a currency union. I show that
the external public debt-to-GDP and the external debt of the banking sector-to-GDP
are important predictors of sovereign debt episodes. Other predictors are 3-year
change in public-debt-to-GDP ratio, inflation level, per capita real GDP, interna-
tional reserves-to-imports ratio, 3-year change in credit-to-GDP ratio, real exchange
rate overvaluation, global growth rate, as well as country characteristics such as being
a small state or a member of a currency union. Although the primary deficit-to-GDP
ratio does not seem to be an indicator for debt distress episode, there is evidence
suggesting that GFN-to-GDP ratio is a predictor.
By using the estimation results, I derive an indicative cutoff probability of debt
distress level. Then, I calculate the corresponding thresholds for debt variables, above
which countries are predicted to experience an episode of debt distress. When all
variables are at their median values, the indicative threshold for external public debt-
to-GDP ratio is equal to 54%. Beyond that level, the model predicts that the country
will experience a sovereign debt distress episode. Similarly, the threshold for the 3-
year change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio is equal to 26 percentage points when
all other variables are at their median levels. These figures can provide guidance to
practitioners who have been relying on judgement, rather than analytical models, for





































































































































Table 3.6: Baseline Results: Probit Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Public debt/GDP)t−1 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.002 0.002
3-year ∆ in (Public debt/GDP)t−1 0.005 0.007* 0.007*
(Ext public debt/GDP)t−1 0.012*** 0.011**
(Ext bank debt/GDP)t−1 0.005***
(Primary deficit/GDP)t−1 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.002
Real GDP growtht−1 0.001 0.003 0.011 0.009
Inflationt−1 0.008** 0.009** 0.010** 0.009**
Per capita real GDPt−1 -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.051***
(Int reserve/imports)t−1 -0.009** -0.008** -0.007* -0.007*
3-year ∆ in (Credit/GDP)t−1 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.011**
Real exc rate overvaluationt−1 0.010* 0.009* 0.012* 0.011*
Global growtht -0.082* -0.085* -0.096* -0.099**
N 1280 1280 1280 1280
Pseudo R-sq 0.128 0.130 0.145 0.157
Obs with dep 1 80 80 80 80
Table 3.7: Results with Dummies: Probit Coefficients
(1) (2) (3)
(Public debt/GDP)t−1 0.002 0.000 0.002
3-year ∆ in (Public debt/GDP)t−1 0.007* 0.007* 0.007*
(Ext public debt/GDP)t−1 0.011** 0.012*** 0.010**
(Ext bank debt/GDP)t−1 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(Primary deficit/GDP)t−1 0.002 0.005 -0.001
Real GDP growtht−1 0.009 0.012 0.013
Inflationt−1 0.009** 0.009** 0.010**
Per capita real GDPt−1 -0.051*** -0.054*** -0.063***
(Int reserve/imports)t−1 -0.007* -0.006 -0.006*
3-year ∆ in (Credit/GDP)t−1 0.011** 0.011** 0.012***
Real exc rate overvaluationt−1 0.011* 0.012** 0.012*
Global growtht -0.099** -0.103** -0.098**
Small state 0.400***
Currency uniont−1 0.482**
N 1280 1280 1280
Pseudo R-sq 0.157 0.168 0.164
Obs with dep 1 80 80 80
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Table 3.8: Results with GFN: Probit Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Public debt/GDP)t−1 0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002
3-year ∆ in (Public debt/GDP)t−1 0.007 0.008* 0.008 0.008
(Ext public debt/GDP)t−1 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.016**
(Ext bank debt/GDP)t−1 0.004*** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.005***
(Primary deficit/GDP)t−1 0.026
(GFN/GDP)t−1 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.015***
Real GDP growtht−1 0.005 0.006 0.018 0.007
Inflationt−1 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.033***
Per capita real GDPt−1 -0.046*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.054***
(Int reserve/imports)t−1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
3-year ∆ in (Credit/GDP)t−1 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.024***
Real exc rate overvaluationt−1 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
Global growtht -0.097 -0.105* -0.115** -0.103*
Small state 0.620***
Currency uniont−1 0.419
N 802 802 802 802
Pseudo R-sq 0.205 0.212 0.233 0.215
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